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The Nebraska Death Penalty Study: 
An Interdisciplinary Symposium 
Introduction 
Robert F. Schopp 
The four papers presented in this symposium reflect upon and develop 
the data presented and the concerns raised during a public 
panel at the University of Nebraska in February 2002. That panel 
and this symposium were organized to promote public discussion of 
and reflection upon an empirical study that examined the death penalty 
as it has been applied in Nebraska during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century! Those who support the death penalty, those who 
oppose it, and those who remain uncertain should agree at least on the 
following proposition. The death penalty raises some of the most important 
and perplexing moral, political, and legal questions that a society 
and its citizens of good conscience must confront. We partially 
define our lives, individually and collectively, by the manner in which 
we address the central questions of personal and political morality 
that we encounter. We define ourselves partially by the positions we 
take regarding these questions but perhaps even more fundamentally 
by the manner in which we pursue the inquiry through which we develop 
these positions. Thus, the manner in which we confront, examine, 
and attempt to resolve the ongoing debates regarding the 
death penalty constitutes an important component of the individual 
and collective lives we live. 
The ongoing debate about the legitimacy of the death penalty can 
be understood as addressing at least three distinct evaluative questions. 
First, is the death penalty constitutional? Does if fall within 
the range of criminal punishments that the United States Constitution 
recognizes as within the legitimate authority of the state or federal 
governments to impose? Second, is the death penalty morally 
justifiable? Although the Constitution places legal limits on the criminal 
punishments that fall within the authority of our criminal justice 
systems, constitutional legitimacy does not entail moral justification. 
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Those who accept the proposition that the Constitution allows capital 
punishment must confront the moral questions regarding the justification 
of capital punishment as an institution and regarding the legitimacy 
of the various roles that individuals must fulfill in such an 
institution. Third, is the death penalty prudent? Does it serve the 
interests ofthe citizens individually and ofthe citizenry collectively to 
maintain an institution of capital punishment? Those who accept the 
propositions that capital punishment is constitutional and morally 
justifiable must also ask whether maintaining such an institution imposes 
costs on society or on individual members of that society that 
provide good and sufficient reasons to refrain from imposing the death 
penalty. 
Conscientious inquiry into each of these questions requires a complex 
analysis that can include a variety of empirical issues. When a 
fragmented Supreme Court overturned death sentences handed down 
under statutes that allowed sentencers to exercise unguided discretion, 
several of the opinions emphasized the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory 
sentencing under such statutes.2 The Court later 
approved capital sentencing statutes designed to guide sentencer discretion 
in a manner intended to reduce the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory 
sentences and to promote sentences consistent with 
legitimate penal purposes, including deterrence and retribution.3 
Empirical questions relevant to the constitutional inquiry can vary 
with the identified legitimate penal purpose. If a sentencing provision 
is intended to deter capital crimes or crime generally, for example, 
empirical study might increase our understanding of the degree and 
manner in which capital sentencing deters some individuals from 
committing such crimes or triggers a counterproductive brutalization 
effect contrary to the deterrent purpose. Alternately, a capital sentencing 
statute might be intended to promote a retributive purpose by 
increasing the correspondence between severity of sentence and offender 
culpability. Empirical evidence of the positive or negative relationship 
between capital sentencing and accepted criteria of 
culpability or moral responsibility would be relevant to the effectiveness 
of such a sentencing provision, and such evidence might provide. 
information that could be used to improve correspondence between 
culpability and sentencing. 
Empirical inquiry might also inform the moral justification of capital 
punishment, although the type of evidence needed can vary with 
the moral justification advanced. Those who would justify capital 
punishment as an institution designed to protect innocent human life, 
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 306-10 (Stewart, 
J., concurring), 310-14 (White, J., concurring) (1972). 
3. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2434-2437 (2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 182-207 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (1976). 
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for example, should be particularly interested in empirical evidence 
regarding the degree to which capital punishment is associated with 
increasing or decreasing homicide rates and regarding the risk of executing 
innocent individuals. Those who would justify capital punishment 
as necessary to fulfill the requirements of retributive justice by 
treating people as they deserve should also be interested in the evidence 
regarding the risk of executing innocent or less than fully culpable 
individuals. They should also be interested in any evidence 
addressing the degree to which sentencers are able to reliably apply 
defensible criteria of desert or identifying the circumstances that enhance 
or undermine that ability. 
Empirical inquiry might inform the prudential evaluation of capital 
punishment insofar as it advances our ability to understand 
whether a constitutionally and morally justifiable institution of capital 
punishment imposes costs on society that undermine the broader 
set of societal interests. Does a justifiable institution of capital punishment 
promote a rigorous process of trial and appeal in the criminal 
justice system more generally, for example, or does it draw so heavily 
on the available resources that it undermines the quality of the criminal 
justice process in noncapital matters? Does the practice of capital 
punishment motivate individual participants in the criminal justice 
system to pursue excellence in the discharge of their responsibilities, 
or does it inflict stress so severe that it undermines their abilities to 
discharge those responsibilities and their general well-being? 
The constitutional, moral, and prudential inquiries are distinct, 
but they are not mutually exclusive. Some empirical questions, such 
as those addressing our abilities to accurately identify guilty and innocent 
defendants or to consistently apply criteria of culpability, may 
have relevance to all three types of inquiry. The specific relevance of 
particular empirical questions can vary with the conceptual and justificatory 
formulations of each inquiry. Thus, it will be difficult to design, 
perform, interpret, and apply empirical inquiries in the absence 
of a more comprehensive analysis of the relevant legal, moral, and 
prudential questions. 
The study reported in the first paper in this symposium represents 
a sophisticated investigation ofthe factors associated with capital sentencing 
in Nebraska during the last quarter ofthe twentieth century.4 
David Baldus and his colleagues collected and analyzed data regarding 
the degree to which capital sentencing during this period reflects 
the presence or absence of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. 
They also examined evidence regarding the degree to which capital 
sentencing during this period is associated with illegitimate factors 
such as the race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status of the offender or 
4. Nebraska Study, supra note 1. 
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of the victim. The study presents a wealth of empirical information 
that can advance serious attempts to evaluate the sentencing process 
and address the evaluative questions. 
In order to understand this empirical information and interpret its 
significance for the three types of evaluative questions previously 
identified, we must review and evaluate the methodology and results 
of the study, and we must examine the relationships among those results 
and the evaluative questions we want to address. The second 
and third papers in this symposium pursue this task. Neither attempts 
to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation of the Nebraska 
Study. Rather, each raises important methodological issues 
regarding the design, interpretation, and application of this study as 
an example of the rigorous application of empirical methodology to difficult 
questions of public policy. In doing so, each strives to provide 
the reader with a greater understanding of the important questions to 
be asked in the processes of interpreting the Nebraska Study and of 
assessing its significance for public policy decisions regarding capital 
punishment in Nebraska. Furthermore, each provides important guidance 
regarding the more general questions that arise when citizens 
or officials must evaluate, interpret, and apply sophisticated empirical 
inquiries intended to inform a broad range of public policy decisions. 
In the second paper, Richard Wiener reviews the Nebraska Study 
from the perspective of a research psychologist with considerable experience 
in the application of social science methodology to questions 
of public policy.5 He discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research 
involving the statistical analysis of archival data, identifies a 
series of additional questions raised by the Nebraska Study, and suggests 
additional research strategies that might expand the understanding 
provided by that study. It is important to recognize that he 
suggests these alternative strategies in addition to, rather than as 
substitutes for, the archival design of the Nebraska Study. These suggestions 
remind us that serious examination of complex legal or social 
institutions requires an extended program of integrated research, 
rather than a single definitive study. Thus, those who are interested 
in pursuing comprehensive understanding of legal institutions are 
committed to an extended agenda of research and analysis. 
In addition to examining the place of the Nebraska Study in a more 
comprehensive program of related research, Wiener addresses the significance 
of the study for Nebraska capital sentencing in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Ring u. Arizona.6 He reviews several 
of the major findings of the Nebraska Study with an eye toward 
suggesting further inquiries that might enrich our understanding of 
5. Richard Wiener, Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges and Juries 
Reach Penalty Decisions?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 757 (2002). 
6. 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). 
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the sentencing process under the current statutory system and of the 
manner in which that system might be revised in order to promote 
consistency with Ring and with legislatively enacted principles of capital 
sentencing. This review constantly draws our attention to the importance 
of designing, performing, and interpreting an extended 
program of empirical research that integrates rigorous design and 
psychological theory with the relevant legal and public policy analysis. 
Jennifer Robbennolt's contribution to this symposium extends this 
focus on the relationship between empirical research and legal analysis. 
She identifies certain aspects of the Nebraska Study that exemplify 
areas of tension that occur more generally between the demands 
of empirical methodology and the needs of legal and public policy decision-makers. 
7 She explores, for example, the tension between the scientific 
use of quantifiable data and the legal requirement of a 
comprehensive, individualized assessment of each offender and offense. 
She also explores a comparable tension between the scientific 
need for rigorous controls of confounding variables and the circumstances 
of sentencing and other legal processes that are open to influence 
by a broad and indefinite set of factors. These two areas of 
tension between social science methodology and the conditions under 
which legal institutions must operate reflect a more general concern 
regarding the compatibility of social science methodology and the 
study of social institutions. Social science methodology seeks quantifiable 
precision in the measurement of the effects of certain variables by 
isolating them from confounding variables or by statistically controlling 
for the effects of those confounding variables. Legal institutions, 
in contrast, must operate in extremely complex circumstances influenced 
by an indefinite variety of known and unknown factors. This 
contrast renders it virtually impossible to design and implement social 
science studies that accurately and comprehensively measure the 
functions of legal institutions in the circumstances in which they 
operate. 
This lack of precise fit invites two complimentary errors. First, 
some readers may tend to reject the social science evidence as irrelevant 
because it is unable to account for all relevant factors. This response 
is misguided because although the social science evidence is 
imperfect, the alternative sources of information regarding the operation 
oflegal institutions, such as the personal experience and common 
sense of the participants, are wrought with a wide and unspecifiable 
array of contaminating factors. Alternately, some readers might recognize 
this misleading potential of reliance on personal experience or 
impressions and opt to rely solely on the social science as the best 
available source of information. This response is misguided because it 
7. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical 
Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777 (2002). 
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fails to recognize and address the unspecified set of factors that the 
studies cannot accommodate. Robbennolt discusses alternative approaches 
that avoid these twin errors of categorical rejection or uncritical 
acceptance of social science data as applied to legal and public 
policy decisionmaking. 
Wiener and Robbennolt reveal similar patterns of analysis, and 
they share at least two common themes. First, they address certain 
concerns that arise in interpreting and applying the Nebraska Study, 
but their discussion addresses useful approaches to the design, execution, 
interpretation, and application of empirical research methodology 
to legal and public policy decisionmaking more generally. Second, 
each rejects the simplistic alternatives of categorically rejecting or uncritically 
accepting data derived from empirical inquiry in favor of a 
more nuanced evaluation of the fit between the empirical methodology 
and the legal and policy questions addressed by that method. 
In the final paper of the symposium, I direct attention to a different 
aspect of the relationship between empirical inquiry and the three 
evaluative questions articulated previously.8 This paper directs the 
readers' attention toward the relationship between principle and practice. 
A legal, moral, or prudential analysis might purport to demonstrate 
that a legal institution is defensible in principle or in practice. 
Insofar as that analysis purports to demonstrate that the institution 
is legally, morally, or prudentially justified in principle, it advances 
arguments contending that the institution as designed conforms to the 
applicable principles or criteria of constitutionality, morality, or social 
interest. A retributive argument in principle for capital punishment, 
for example, would advance reasoning to support the contentions that 
we ought to punish culpable offenders in proportion to their desert 
and that capital punishment constitutes such proportionate punishment 
for those who commit certain crimes under certain conditions. 
Alternately, an instrumental justification in principle for capital punishment 
might advance reasoning to support the contentions that capital 
punishment for certain offenders provides the most effective 
preventive effects of deterrence or incapacitation. 
Insofar as the justificatory analysis purports to demonstrate that 
the institution is justified in practice, empirical evidence can provide 
information regarding the degree to which the institution in practice 
conforms to the justifications in principle. To the extent that empirical 
evidence provides reason to believe that the institution in practice 
deviates from the putative justification in principle for that institution, 
it calls into question the justification for maintaining the institution 
as it is currently applied. Such evidence might also contribute to 
8. Robert F. Schopp, Justifying Capital Punishment in Principle and in Practice: 
Empirical Evidence of Distortions in Application, 81 NEB. L. REV. 805 (2002). 
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further inquiry regarding the degree to which it is reasonable to think 
that distortions in practice are subject to amelioration. Thus, comprehensive 
arguments regarding the justification (or lack thereof) for an 
institution in practice may require a complex integration of empirical 
evidence with justificatory reasoning. 
The papers in this symposium make no pretense that they can resolve 
the final questions regarding the constitutional, moral, or prudential 
justification (or lack thereof) of capital punishment in 
principle or in practice. Rather they attempt to advance these inquiries 
by improving our ability to understand the manner in which the 
death penalty has been administered in Nebraska during the last 
quarter of a century. Such understanding cannot by itself resolve the 
evaluative inquiries, but it can inform the more comprehensive analyses. 
By facilitating our ability to responsibly pursue these integrated 
analyses, a well-designed and applied empirical research program can 
enhance our ability to formulate defensible decisions to endorse, repudiate, 
or modify our current institutions of capital punishment. By 
developing our abilities to pursue similarly integrated analyses regarding 
other issues, we can enhance our ability to responsibly address 
a range of difficult public policy questions. 
